We study the joint dynamics of foreign capital flows and real activity during the recent boombust cycle of the Spanish economy, using a two-country New Keynesian DSGE model. We estimate the model using data for Spain and for an aggregate of the rest of the world (ROW). The model includes a construction sector and a government. We show that falling risk premia on Spanish housing, as well as a the fall in the interest rate spread between Spain and the ROW fuelled the sharp rise in Spanish housing investment before the financial crisis, and that these drivers increased the fragility of the balance sheets of Spanish households and firms. We find no strong evidence that excessive wage growth mattered for external imbalance during the boom. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, falling house prices, a resurgence of the Spanish external interest spread, and a tightening of collateral constraints for Spanish households and firms, led to a sharp reduction in capital flows to Spain, and to a persistent fall in Spanish real activity. The correction of the Spanish trade deficit, since the crisis, relies mostly on a decline in domestic absorption triggered by tightened of financial constraints.
Introduction
After the creation of the Euro in 1999, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and other countries in the EU periphery ran sizable current account deficits. This was often accompanied by output and construction booms in these countries, and by inflation rates above the Euro Area average. In the wake of the global financial crisis , private capital flows to the periphery countries fell sharply, and a strong contraction in real activity and house prices ensued.
This paper provides a quantitative analysis of the joint dynamics of external capital flows and real activity in Spain, the largest of the Euro Area countries that received sizable capital inflows after the creation of the Euro, and then experienced a sudden stop. We do so using a two-country New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model consisting of Spain and an aggregate of the rest of the world (ROW). We estimate this model using quarterly data, for Spain and the ROW during the period 1995Q1-2013Q2. The Spanish bloc of the model has a rich structure that allows us to capture the key features of the Spanish boom-bust cycle. In particular, we assume a construction sector and a government sector; Spanish households and non-financial firms face collateral constraints.
1 The model assumes demand and supply shocks in goods, labor and asset markets, as well as nominal price and wage rigidities. We use the model as a laboratory for quantifying the key drivers and transmission mechanisms that explain the dynamics of the Spanish trade balance since 1995.
The creation of the Euro eliminated intra Euro Area currency risk and led to a convergence of Spanish interest rates to the lower interest rates in the rest of the Euro Area. Competing explanations for the boom in the Spanish economy are loosening credit conditions and housing and stock market bubbles. We find that all these factors fuelled a sharp rise in Spanish housing investment and house prices, and increased the fragility of the balance sheets of Spanish households and non-financial firms. Our estimates suggest that a large part of the build-up in Spanish net external debt after the introduction of the Euro can be attributed to positive shocks to foreign capital inflows. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, a fall in house prices, a resurgence of the Spanish external interest rate spread, and a tightening of collateral constraints for households and firms, led to a sharp reduction in capital flows to Spain, and a persistent fall in Spanish output and housing investment. The fall in private 3 capital inflows was at first partly counterbalanced by a rise in public capital inflows; however, public capital inflows too dried up when the Spanish sovereign debt crisis erupted, in 2010, following the dramatic deterioration of the Spanish government balance due to the recession.
Our analysis highlights the key role of the housing market for the transmission of external capital supply shocks to Spanish real activity. Real house prices doubled between 2001 and 2007, and then fell by about 40% (2008-12) . This triggered a severe financial crisis, which led to a sharp contraction of lending to firms and households, and a rise in loan rates.
The economic events in Spain (and other European periphery countries) during the past 15 years are, in many respects, reminiscent of the boom-bust cycles accompanied by capital inflows and sudden stops experienced by many economies in Latin America and Asia during the 20 th century; see Calvo et al. (2004) for an empirical overview. The literature on sudden stops uses highly stylized models; see, e.g., Calvo (1998) , Mendoza (2010) , Reis (2013) and Fornaro (2013) . By contrast, the present paper analyzes a boom-bust cycle linked to international capital in-and outflows, using a fully-fledged estimated DSGE model.
Economic theory suggests that a country's CA reflects domestic and foreign macroeconomic and financial shocks, and the structural features of the domestic and foreign economies. This underscores the importance of analyzing the CA using a quantitative dynamic general equilibrium model that captures the relevant shocks, and their transmission to the macroeconomy.
Several recent empirical studies have highlighted the role of housing and credit markets for the dynamics of the current account (e.g., Aizenman and Jinjarak (2013) , Chinn et al. (2013) , European Commission (2012)). The paper here analyzes that role using an estimated DSGE model. The present paper is also related to a literature that analyzes current account dynamics using DSGE models (e.g., Kollmann (1998) , Erceg et al. (2006) , Gomes, Jacquinot and Pisani (2012) ); by contrast to the paper here, that literature has typically used calibrated models (not estimated), and it has abstracted from housing markets and the key financial frictions considered in the present model.
Section 2 describes the dynamics of the Spanish macroeconomy during the past two decades.
Section 3 describes our model. Section 4 discusses model estimates. Section 5 discusses 4 dynamic responses to shocks in the estimated model, and Section 6 discusses historical shock decompositions. Section 7 concludes.
Dynamics of the Spanish macroeconomy
For most of the decade up to 2007, GDP growth in Spain exceeded average growth in the Euro Area. But the financial and economic crisis hit Spain severely, with quarter-to-quarter annualized growth rates falling to almost -6% in the first quarter of 2009; Spain experienced a weaker recovery in 2010-11 than the rest of the Euro Area, and entered into a second-dip recession in 2012. During the boom years, all domestic demand components grew faster than GDP; this was especially the case for investment, and in particular residential investment (see Fig. 1 .e). By contrast the Spanish consumption-to-GDP ratio rose much less; that ratio averaged about 60% before the crisis (about 4 pp. higher than the Euro Area average), but fell 
Model description [INCOMPLETE!]
We consider a two-country model consisting of Spain and the rest of the world (ROW Firms in the final goods production sector are indexed by j. Each firm produces a variety of the domestic good which is an imperfect substitute for varieties produced by other firms.
2 The model is an extension of the QUEST model estimated on euro area data (Ratto, Roeger and in 't Veld, 2009 ) with a housing sector and collateral constrained households. A similar version has been estimated on US data (in 't Veld et al., 2011) and on German data (Kollmann, Ratto, Roeger, in't Veld and Vogel, 2013 
, with We also consider financial shocks in the production process: all firms pay factors of production before production occurs. Firms face the following collateral requirement:
where is firm debt at the end of period t, while is the period t real interest rate on loans. The loan-to-value ratio, , is subject to exogenous disturbances:
The period t dividend of a final good producers is:
where K t i denotes the rental rate of capital. Firms face technological and regulatory constraints which restrict their price setting, employment and capacity utilization decisions.
Price setting rigidities can be the result of the internal organization of the firm or specific customer-firm relationships. Costs of adjusting labour have a job specific component (e.g. training costs) but higher employment adjustment costs may also arise in heavily regulated labour markets with search frictions. Costs associated with the utilization of capital can result from higher maintenance costs associated with a more intensive use of a piece of capital equipment. Finally, we follow Jermann and Quadrini (2012) and assume that the firm's payout is subject to a quadratic cost. The following convex functional forms are chosen 
Residential construction
Monopolistically competitive firms h in the residential construction sector use new land ) to produce new houses using a CES technology
New and existing houses are perfect substitutes. Thus households can make capital gains or suffer capital losses depending on house price fluctuations.
Investment goods producers
There is a perfectly competitive investment goods production sector which combines domestic and foreign final goods, using the same CES aggregators as households and governments do to produce investment goods for the domestic economy. Denote the CES 
Households
The household sector consists of a continuum of households ). We also allow for habit persistence in consumption. Thus period utility function is:
All two types of households supply differentiated labour services to unions which maximize a joint utility function for each type of labour i. It is assumed that types of labour are distributed equally over the two household types. Nominal rigidity in wage setting is introduced by assuming that the household faces adjustment costs for changing wages. These adjustment costs are borne by the household.
Ricardian households
Ricardian households have full access to financial markets. They hold domestic government bonds( We assume that all domestic firms are owned by Ricardian households. Income from labour is taxed at rate t w , consumption at rate c t . In addition households pay lump-sum taxes T LS . We assume that income from financial wealth is subject to different types of risk. Domestic bonds and interest income from deposits yield risk-free real return equal to r t . Domestic and foreign bonds are subject to (stochastic) risk premia linked to net foreign indebtedness. An equity premium on real assets arises because of uncertainty about the future value of real assets.
Furthermore, the Ricardian household's subjective discount factor is subject to random shocks. The household's decision problem is to maximize live-time utility
 is the agent's subjective discount factor between periods t and t+1) subject to the following budget constraint and laws of motion of asset stocks: 
The budget constraint is written in real terms with all prices expressed relative to the GDP deflator (P). Investment is a composite of domestic and foreign goods.
We follow Bernanke and Gertler (1999) 
Like Bernanke and Gertler, we use the term "bubble" loosely to denote temporary deviations of asset prices from fundamentals due to waves of optimism and excessive risk taking in periods of rising asset prices, and waves of pessimism or panics in periods of increased uncertainty. In the context of the current crisis, alternative explanations could be given for a sudden fall in asset prices. For example, an increase in
z could capture what Gorton (2010) calls a "panic", to describe the uncertainty about the value of certain asset classes which have forced banks to deliver and dump assets, leading to falling asset values. A rising i t z could also capture what Hall (2010) refers to as "principal agent frictions", which he models by introducing an exogenous wedge shock between safe (government bonds) and risky assets (equity and houses) in order to empirically match rising spreads between safe and risky assets.
The interest rate that households face when making consumption and investment decisions depends on the aggregate level of foreign indebtedness (defined as
This specification corresponds to the debt-dependent interest rate premium widely assumed in open economy models (e.g., Senhadj (1994), Kollmann (2002) , Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003)). This specification induces a stationary equilibrium. However, we also regard the interest elasticity w.r.t. foreign debt as an important behavioral parameter describing the risk tolerance of foreign creditors. The parameter rprem together with the rate of time preference of Ricardian households determines the steady state debt level of the economy.
Credit constrained households
Credit constrained households differ from Ricardian households in two respects. First they have a higher rate of time preference 
There is a non-fundamental shock to housing investment which is constrained to be equal across household types.
Wage setting
A trade union sets the (after-tax) real wage rate at a mark-up above the ratio of a weighted average of the marginal utilities of leisure of the two household types to a weighted average of their marginal utilities of consumption, multiplied by a time-varying wage mark-up factor, that reflects wage adjustment costs 
 is the wage mark-up factor (that factor fluctuates around the inverse of the elasticity of substitution between different varieties of labour services).
Trade and the current account
In order to facilitate aggregation we assume that households, the government and the firm sector have identical preferences across goods used for private consumption, public expenditure and investment. Let 
where the share parameter s M can be subject to random shocks u M and 
Policy
Both government expenditure and receipts respond to business cycle conditions. On the expenditure side we identify the systematic response of government consumption, government transfers and government investment to the annual GDP growth rate. In addition, all three expenditure components are used to stabilize the debt to GDP ratio, where T b is the government debt target and T def is the associated deficit target. For government consumption and government investment we specify the following rules for government consumption and investment, normalized by trend productivity, 
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We assume consumption and capital income tax to follow a linear scheme, but a progressive labour income tax schedule i from a synthetic interest rate determined by a Taylor rule for Spain that responds to consumer price inflation and the annual growth rate of output, with weights based on estimates for the euro area (Ratto et al., 2009) 
Market clearing for final goods and domestic credit
market clearing conditions hold for final domestic goods and for and final imported goods requires:
where total domestic and imported consumption 
Model estimation [INCOMPLETE!]
We calibrate selected parameters that pin down key steady state properties of the model, and estimate the remaining parameters using Bayesian methods. The estimation uses quarterly data for the period 1995Q1 to 2013Q2. 5 Concerning the steady state calibration, parameters shown in Table 1 have been calibrated to match ratios of main economic aggregates (productive investment, construction investment and government consumption and investment) to GDP over the period 1995-1999. 6 The two general exceptions to this are the calibration of the labour market and the steady state debt ratios. For the former the 1995-99 averages can no longer be considered representative of the Spanish labour market, as labour market reforms have led to a regime shift in the Spanish economy. Instead we base the calibration of labour market parameters on the full sample 1995Q1-2013Q2. The steady state employment rate as share of total population is set to 0.41, the wage share to 57%.
Concerning the government debt ratio, we impose the debt target of 60% of GDP, which is close to the sample average. This target implies, given the nominal growth rate in the steady state, a deficit target of 2.5% of GDP. The average maturity of sovereign debt is set at 5 years.
Tax rates are calibrated on sample averages. Government transfers to households are set to ) is set at 0.4% quarterly. Based on the whole sample, the quarterly GDP trend growth rate was set to 0.55%, while the inflation trend growth rate is set to 0.5%. Credit-constrained households are calibrated with a high rate of time preference, 4% per quarter, while the discount rate for non-constrained households is estimated (see below). The euro area discount rate is set at 0.5% quarterly, openness is estimated at 0.29.
The estimation results of the main structural parameters are summarised in Table 2 
Impulse response functions
In this section, we discuss the dynamic effects of shocks which have played a prominent role for the boom and bust cycle of the Spanish economy. In particular we look at financial shocks and trade shocks.
Shock to housing risk premium (house price bubble), Figure 2.a.
A rise in the house price driven by a fall in the housing risk premium (positive housing bubble) increases residential investment. While the shock leads households to shift expenditure from consumption to residential investment, the shock boosts aggregate demand, which raises domestic inflation; initially, this reduces the domestic real interest rate (given the weak response of the nominal interest rate, due to monetary union), which also stimulates non-housing investment. The rise in domestic absorption raises domestic GDP and employment. The trade balance deteriorates persistently--this is also due to the loss of external competitiveness that results from higher domestic inflation. The rise in inflation also leads to a real appreciation (fall in the real exchange rate, in Figure 2 .a).
Shock to household loan to value ratio, Figure 2.b.
A loosening of household financing conditions allows credit constrained households to increase both consumption and residential investment, but crowds out non-residential investment. Absorption increases, which leads to a trade balance deterioration.
External risk premium shock, Figure 2.c.
A permanent reduction of the external risk premium leads to a persistent increase of all domestic demand components. The expansionary effect is reinforced in the short run by the fall in the real interest rate caused by inflationary pressure. Because of a loss of price competiveness and rising domestic demand the trade balance turns strongly negative. It is however, important to notice that, even though there is a permanent reduction of the risk premium, the effect on domestic demand is not permanent. This is best illustrated in the case of residential investment. The fall in the risk premium lowers mortgage rates, however because of a (land) constraint for the supply of houses this leads to an increase in house prices, which eventually dominates the capital cost effect and reverts the residential investment boom. Nevertheless the demand expansion remains important over the medium term and leaves the trade balance persistently negative.
Shock to firm loan-to-value ratio (final goods sector), Figure 2.d.
A tightening of firm financing conditions leads to a temporary reduction of productive investment, which is only marginally offset by a rise in private consumption and residential investment. This translates into an improvement in the trade balance (which is however small compared to the drop in productive investment).
Shock to risk premium on productive capital, Figure 2.e.
Effects are very similar to changes in firm financing conditions.
Shock to government consumption, Figure 2. f.
An increase in government consumption crowds out private demand components, most notably productive investment. However the net demand effect remains positive, which leads to an initial decline of the trade balance.
Shock to export demand, Figure 2 .g. Figure 2 .g shows dynamic responses to a shift of preferences in favor of Spanish goods. That export demand shock leads to a persistent increase in domestic GDP. The resulting rise in domestic inflation leads to a decline in the Spanish real interest rate, and thus the rise in exports does not crowd out domestic demand. The shock only leads to a short run trade balance improvement, because of opposing income and competitiveness effects.
Spanish export price mark-up shock, Figure 2.h.
A negative shock to export prices has a negative short run effect on the trade balance (J curve effect) which is followed by a more persistent improvement with the trade balance.
Historical shock decompositions
The estimated shocks can be used to provide a historical decomposition of the data (e.g., Christiano et al, 2008) . Figures 3.a. -3.f. do this for Spanish domestic demand components (normalized by GDP) and the Spanish trade balance. To keep the analysis tractable we only focus on the main shocks highlighted, and group the contribution of all other shocks into a residual category referred to as "others".
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Residential investment (Figure 3 .a)
Residential investment was the main driver of the Spanish boom and bust cycle. The shock decomposition shows that two main shocks explain the residential investment boom, namely negative shocks to the housing risk premium (positive housing bubble), and a fall in the Spanish external interest rate spread. The latter only generated a temporary increase in housing investment. This is because the increase in house prices (due to land constraint) stabilize residential investment. A prolonged boom in residential investment can only be generated by a housing bubble.
Interestingly, the shock estimates suggest a tightening of the loan-to-value ratio for household mortgages in the first half of the 2000s; however, the tightening was far from strong enough to compensate for the expansion of the collateral value generated by the bubble. We only identify a loosening of the collateral constraint in the last years preceding the fall in residential investment.
Starting in 2008, the housing bubble bursts, and housing investment (as a share of GDP) declined strongly. The bursting of the bubble was accompanied by a tightening of loan-tovalue ratios.
Consumption (Figure 3.b)
Contrary to residential investment, Spanish private consumption has remained relatively stable as a share of GDP. This should not be interpreted as if the factors driving the residential investment boom were unimportant for consumption. Rather, the stability of the consumption ratio (while residential investment rose sharply) is due to rising household debt. Interestingly, the historical decomposition shows that the housing bubble contributed negatively to private consumption--everything else equal, the housing bubble would have led to a fall in consumption (due to the strong rise in residential investment triggered by the shock).
However, this effect was offset by the fact that the fall in the Spanish interest rate spread allowed Spanish households to borrow more from the rest of the world. Towards the end of the boom, a loosening of loan-to-value ratios stabilized the consumption/GDP ratio. However, after 2008 a collateral tightening sets in which eventually reduces both the consumption and the residential investment share
Non-housing investment (Figure 3.c)
Productive (non-housing) investment increased as well from 1996 onwards. A major driver for this was the decline in the Spanish interest rate spread which lowered the borrowing capital costs for Spanish firms. As for household (mortgage) loans, the estimates suggest no loosening of the collateral constraint facing firms during most of the boom, even a slight tightening. It is only towards the end of the boom that the collateral constraint for firms is slightly loosened. In 2012 the collateral constraint tightened again. The investment boom was also fuelled by low risk premium for non-housing capital and by rising employment made possible by falling wage mark ups. According our results, the abrupt decline of investment during the financial crisis is associated with a rise in the investment risk premium, a collapse in external demand and insufficient downward wage adjustment (which amounted to a rise in the wage mark-up). Reduced lending only played a minor role. Unlike residential investment, 20 during the bust the productive investment/GDP ratio did not fall below the level reached in
1999.
Trade balance (Figure 3.d) The factors driving consumption, residential investment and productive investment also shape the evolution of the trade balance (see Figure 3. period. This should, however, not be misinterpreted, since we only measure the impact of shocks to exports and export prices, i. e. increases in market share which cannot be explained by a fall in the terms of trade or a fall in export prices (fall in export price mark ups) which cannot be explained by a fall in unit labour cost.
Concluding remarks
This paper has shown how an open economy DSGE model with financial frictions and financial shocks can be used to analyses the driving factors behind internal and external imbalances in the Spanish economy. Our estimates suggest that the key factors behind those imbalances were low real interest rates, linked to the inflow of foreign capital, and a housing bubble. The persistence of the housing boom, which is the most noticeable macroeconomic event in Spain, can only be explained by a persistent fall in housing risk premia. Lending to households and firms has accommodated the growth in loan demand fuelled by the asset price boom. The adjustment in the trade balance after the financial crisis is mainly driven by the collapse in the housing bubbles, and a tightening of lending conditions. The correction of the trade balance relies mostly on a decline in domestic absorption and a drop in imports. The accompanying deflation and decline in unit labour costs bring about a further depreciation of the real effective exchange rate. We find no strong evidence of excessive wage growth as a driver of the Spanish external imbalance during the boom. 
